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Physician Willingness to Withhold Tube
Feeding After Cruzan: An Empirical Study
Philip G. Peters,Jr., JD'
John W. Ely, MD, MSPH'"
Steven C. Zweig, MD, MSPH*
Nancy C. Elder, MD, MSPIF. David Schneider,MD, MSPH'**...
In Cruzan v. Hannon,2 the Missouri Supreme Court declined to let
Nancy Cruzan's father discontinue her tube feedings.3 The court insisted on
clear and convincing evidence of her wishes and was unsatisfied that proof of
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this kind had been presented in her case.' In addition, it refused to defer to
her family 5 or to consider her "quality of life."6 On June 25, 1990, the
United States Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court's
decision.7 Since Cruzan, public demand for living wills has exploded.
In the spring of 1991, we began a study to explore how the Cruzan
decision and the heightened awareness of living wills had affected medical
decision-making. We were curious and uncertain about the probable impact
of living wills in a clinical setting. We were particularly interested in
comparing the strength of living wills to that of family preferences. To study
these questions, we mailed to all Missouri family physicians a questionnaire
which explored the circumstances under which they would recommend tube
feeding for a hypothetical elderly patient with severe neurological impairment.
The results of this study yielded four insights into the uneasy coexistence of law and medicine in the field of death and dying. First, Cruzan
appears to have measurably altered family and physician decision-making.
Both physicians and families are less willing to initiate heroic measures in the
aftermath of Cruzan. Physicians also stated that they now ask for better
evidence of their patients' wishes. Second, Cruzan has not stopped physicians
from recommending against tube feeding when patient wishes are unknown.
Nearly half of the physicians were willing to withhold tube feeding from our
elderly patient. Two-thirds of these physicians were willing to withhold tube
feeding even if the patient had no living will notwithstanding the doubts cast
by Cruzan on the legality of doing so. Third, physicians were evenly divided
in their deference to a living will of uncertain applicability. Fourth, families
could readily influence physician recommendations even though family
members lack legal standing in Missouri to make these decisions.
I. METHODOLOGY

In May 1991, all 631 members of the Missouri Academy of Family
Physicians were mailed a questionnaire asking specific questions about the
impact of the Cruzan opinion on their practice and also about their attitudes
towards living wills. The questionnaire then asked whether they would
administer tube feedings to an elderly man with severe neurological impairment under several hypothetical situations.
All of the questionnaires asked the physician to assume that the patient
had executed a living will, a copy of which was provided on the reverse side

4.
5.
6.
7.

Id. at 424.
Id. at 426.
Id. at 422.
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S.Ct. 2841 (1990).
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of the questionnaire. The text of the living will was taken from a form widely
distributed in Missouri and Kansas by the Midwest Bioethics Center and the
.Kansas City Metropolitan Bar Association." This living will form was drafted
to comply with the statutes of Missouri and Kansas. As a result, it is
explicitly limited to terminal conditions. Although the back side of the
Midwest Bioethics Center form provided for expansion of the scope of consent
by the patient, we did not use that portion of the form. For half of the
questionnaires, however, the respondents were informed that the patient had
supplemented this "standard" living will to specifically include nutrition and
hydration. 9
The physicians were then asked whether they would recommend tube
feeding for an elderly patient with severe neurological impairment. They were
given the following information about the patient:
One week ago you admitted a previously healthy 89-year-old retired farmer
with sudden aphasia ° and dense right hemiparesis." CT scan shows a
left-hemisphere infarct. 2 He is unable to swallow and is on maintenance

8. The text read as follows:
If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or illness
certified to be a terminal condition by two physicians who have
personally examined me, one of whom shall be my attending
physician, and the physicians have determined that my death will
occur whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized and
where the application of life-sustaining procedures would serve only
to artificially prolong the dying process, and I am unable to
participate in decisions regarding my medical treatment, I direct that
such procedures be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted
to die naturally with only the administration of medication or the
performance of any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide
me with comfort.
9. The language for this portion of the living will read: "I consider
artificial nutrition and hydration (nutrition and fluid given through a tube in
the vein, nose, or stomach) as just another method of 'artificially prolonging
the dying process.'
10. Aphasia is defined as "impaired or absent comprehension of or
communication by speech, writing or signs, due to dysfunction of brain
centers in the dominant hemisphere." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL DICTIONARY 104
(25th ed. 1990).
11. Hemiparesis is defined as "paralysis affecting one side of the body."
Id. at 695. A dense hemiparesis refers to a total paralysis of one side of the
body.
12. Infarct is defined as "an area of necrosis resulting from a sudden
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IV fluids. His neurologic status has not changed since admission except
that he is more alert; however, he is unable to communicate. You tell the
family that a decision needs to be made about a feeding tube and that you
expect his aphasia and hemiparesis will not improve significantly but that
you will not be able to give an accurate prognosis for 6-8 more weeks.
The respondents were then asked whether they would recommend tube feeding
and whether they would change that recommendation under different factual
assumptions.13 The variations included assumptions about the family's
wishes (either "pushing for" or "pushing against" a feeding tube), the absence
of a living will, the timing vis-a-vis the Cruzan decision, a change in the age
of the patient (48 instead of 89), and a one-year period of feeding without
clinical change.
Seventy-two percent (72%) of the physicians responded.14
The
significance of differences between groups of physicians were determined
using the chi-square statistic. 5 SPSS Version 4.016 was used to analyze the
data.

II. RESULTS
The responses indicate that Cruzan has significantly affected the
environment in which decisions about life-sustaining treatment are made.
More than half of the respondents (51%) reported that patients and their
families resist trials of heroic therapy more often now than they did before
Cruzan. Many physicians were also less aggressive in their treatment
recommendations after Cruzan. In response to our questions about tube
feeding for an elderly patient with severe neurological impairment, twenty-two
percent (22%) of the physicians who opposed tube feedings said they would
have recommended tube feedings prior to Cruzan. Both findings are
consistent with widely expressed fears that people would resist the initiation
of life-sustaining procedures out of suspicion that the treatments could not

insufficiency of arterial or venous blood supply." Id. at 779. Necrosis is
"death of one or more cells, or of a portion of tissue or organ." Id. at 1026.
13. The responses indicated whether the physician favored tube feeding,
intravenous fluids or neither. They were dichotomized to "recommends
feeding tube" versus "recommends no feeding tube."
14. This figure was calculated after excluding 18 physicians who were
part of the pilot study.
15. This is a statistical test used to measure the significance of differences in responses.
16. This is a computer software program that performs data analysis.
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thereafter be stopped.' 7 Over fifty-five percent (55%) of the physicians also
reported that they now ask for clearer evidence of patients' wishes than they
did before Cruzan.
The impact of living wills was more difficult to assess. Fifty-nine
percent (59%) of the physicians said living wills are very useful in the care
of their patients; thirty-one percent (31%) felt that they are somewhat useful;
and ten percent (10%) concluded they are not useful.18 Despite this strong
endorsement of living wills in the abstract, the actual impact of the living will
forms used in our hypothetical case study was more modest. When asked
whether they would recommend tube feedings for an elderly patient with
neurological impairment and a living will, only forty-seven percent (47%) of
the physicians opposed tube feedings. Not surprisingly, the opposition to tube
feeding was higher among physicians who received the living will specifically
refusing nutrition and hydration (53%) than among those who received the
standard living will (42%; p=.02). When the physicians who had initially
opposed tube feeding were asked what they would recommend in the absence
of either type of living will, thirty-three (33%) changed their recommendations. Physicians who received the standard living will were less likely to
change their recommendations than physicians who received the specific living
will (26% v. 40%; p <0.05).
The influence of family preferences was more dramatic. When
physicians were asked what they would recommend if the family opposed
feeding tubes, forty-two percent (42%) of the physicians who initially
recommended tube feedings changed their recommendations.
Family
preferences were more influential among physicians who received questionnaires containing the standard living will than among those who received the
specific living will (49% vs. 31%; p < 0.01).
Families who favored tube feedings were even more influential than
families who opposed them. When asked what they would do if the family
favored tube feeding, sixty-six percent (66%) of those physicians who had

17. E.g., Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2870 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Cruzan,
760 S.W.2d at 440 (Higgins, J., dissenting); L. Gregory Pawlson, Impact of
the Cruzan Case on Medical Practice, 19 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 69, 71
(1991); Ellen C. Weiss, The Effect of the Treatment Setting on the DecisionMaking Process:Acute CareHospitals and Emergency Services, 19 L. MED.
& HEALTH CARE 66, 67-68 (1991).
18. Those physicians who said living wills were very useful were only
slightly less likely to recommend feeding tubes than those physicians who said
living wills were somewhat useful or not useful (51% vs. 55%). Thus, the
group of physicians who least valued living wills were not, as one might have
suspected, significantly more resistant to the idea of withholding lifesustaining care.
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initially opposed tube feeding said they would now recommend it. 9 Once
again, deference to family pressures varied with the kind of living will
received. More physicians who received the standard living will changed their
recommendation in response to family requests than did those who received
the specific living will (75% vs. 57%; p < 0.01).
The differences in responses between urban and rural physicians and
between male and female physicians were not statistically significant. Other
findings of the study, such as the influence of changes in patient age and
prognosis, are contained in the full study as published in the Journal of the
American GeriatricsSociety.20 In addition, the full study contains information about the most common comments written on the questionnaires.
III. LIMITATIONS
The study has several potential limitations. First, our findings are based
on what physicians said they would do, rather than on what they did. A
previous study found a strong correlation between predicted and actual
action, 2' but this correlation has not been tested for life-sustaining treatments.
Second, caution must be exercised in generalizing these findings to other
forms of life-sustaining treatments. Even though most courts22 and medical
ethicists?3 treat tube feedings as a form of medical care which may be
withheld in appropriate circumstances, some physicians2 4 and the Missouri

19. Even the physicians who had based their decision to withhold tube
feeding entirely on the living will were willing to administer tube feeding if
the family insisted. Sixty-nine percent favored a feeding tube under these
circumstances.
20. Ely et al., supra note 1.
21. J.R. Kirwan et al., Clinical Judgment in Rheumatoid Arthritis: L
Rheumatologists' Opinions and the Development of 'Paper Patients,' 42
ANNALS RHEUMATIC DISEASES 644, 645 (1983).
22. ALAN MEISEL, THE RIGHT TO DIE § 5.10 (1989).
23. See, e.g., THE HASTINGS CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION
OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF THE DYING (1987);
Bernard Lo & Laurie Dornbrand, Guiding the Hand That Feeds: Caringfor
the DementedElderly, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 402 (1984); Robert Steinbrook
& Bernard Lo, Artificial Feeding-Solid Ground Not a Slippery Slope, 318
NEW ENG. J. MED. 286 (1988).
24. E.g., PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS
IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT:
A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL,
MEDICAL AND LEGAL ISSUE IN TREATMENT DECISIONS 90, 190 (1983); Diane

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss3/2

6

1992]

Peters et al.: Peters: Physician Willingness
TUBE FEEDINGAFTER CRUZAN

Supreme Court' seem to disagree, and the Missouri legislature has treated
tube feeding inconsistently. 26 Finally, our findings may not be generalizable
to states other than Missouri or to specialties other than family practice.
Because the rules upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cruzan were those of
Missouri, the case may be more influential here than in other states. In
addition, family practitioners may be more likely to involve family members
in a treatment decision and less likely to treat aggressively than other
specialists.27
IV. DISCUSSION
A. The Influence of Cruzan
The Missouri Supreme Court felt that insistence on strong evidence of
patients' wishes was a reasonable way of minimizing erroneous decisions to
end life-sustaining care.28 To this extent, the judges will find comfort in one
of our findings. Over fifty-five percent (55%) of the physicians reported that
they ask for clearer evidence of patients' previously expressed wishes after
Cruzan than they had before. However, they do not always insist on such
evidence before withholding tube feeding. In our scenario, the physicians had
no information about the patient's unwritten instructions, yet two-thirds of the
physicians who recommended against tube feeding said they would have done
so even if the patient had no living will.
On the other hand, the dissenters in both the United States Supreme
Cour 9 and the Missouri Supreme Court"0 predicted that the difficult burden

L. Redleaf et al., The CaliforniaNaturalDeath Act. An EmpiricalStudy of
Physicians' Practices, 31 STAN. L. REV. 913, 932-33 (1979).
25. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 412, 423.
26. Compare Mo. REV. STAT § 459.010.3 (1986) (statutory definition of
"death-prolonging procedures" excludes artificial nutrition and hydration) with
Mo. REV. STAT. § 404.820 (1991 Supp.) (durable power of attorney statute
permits withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration but only if the patient
specifically grants that power and subject to special requirements).
27. Efrem Alemayehu et al., Variability In Physicians' Decisions on
Caring for Chronically Ill Elderly Patients: An InternationalStudy, 144
CANADIAN MED. ASS'N J. 1133, 1138 (1991); Terry A. Travis et al., The
Attitudes of PhysiciansToward ProlongingLife, 5 INT'L J. PSYCHIATRY MED.
17, 21 (1974).
28. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 424.
29. Cruzan, 110 S.Ct. at 2870 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
30. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 440 (Higgins, J., dissenting).
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of proof placed on families who wish to terminate life-sustaining medical care
would discourage the initiation of heroic care.3 ' Regrettably, this prediction
was well-founded. Over half of our respondents reported that patients and
their families are resisting trials of heroic therapy more often now than they
had before Cruzan. The bright side of this finding is that patients and their
families may now be more willing to voice their objections to aggressive care,
The dark side is that they feel the necessity to decline trials of heroic
measures. In the months after Cruzan it was rare to attend a conference on
death and dying without hearing anecdotes about ill-advised refusals to initiate
even short term heroic measures. More than ever, patients and families now
fear that they will be unable to stop treatment once it has begun.
Even physicians are less aggressive about initiating care than they were
before Cruzan. In our hypothetical scenario, forty-seven percent (47%)
opposed tube feeding. Of them twenty-two percent (22%) said they would
have recommended tube feeding before Cruzan. This finding surprised us.
In Cruzan, the Missouri Supreme Court had insisted that tube feeding be
continued for a 30-year-old woman in a persistent vegetative state absence
clear and convincing evidences of her wishes. In the view of the court, the
state's "unqualified" interest in preserving human life required continued
feeding because her artificial hydration and nutrition were not "oppressively
burdensome" to her3 2 and because the evidence of her wishes was not
sufficiently reliable.33 After this decision, we had suspected that physicians
would feel more obliged to administer nutrition and hydration than they had
before. Our data suggest a contrary response. Only three percent (3%) of the
physicians who favored tube feeding on our facts would have opposed it
before Cruzan, while twenty-two percent (22%) of those who opposed tube
feeding on our facts would have recommended it before Cruzan.
There are at least two plausible explanations why physicians might be
more inclined to withhold tube feedings after Cruzan.34 First, the increased

31. Ethicists had also predicted this result. See supra note 17.
32. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 423-24.
33. Id. at 424.
34. In addition, the failure of Cruzan to prompt more aggressive care in
our scenario may be explained by factual differences between our scenario and
the facts of Cruzan. Our scenario was different in two important respects; our
patient had a much shorter life expectancy than Nancy Cruzan and his tube
feeding had not yet started. Indeed, forty-five percent (45%) of the physicians
who opposed tube feeding for our 89-year-old patient would have recommended treatment if the patient had been 48 years old. These factual differences
may explain why Cruzan did not generate more aggressive care in our case.
But it would not account for the increased tendency to oppose life support
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reluctance of our respondents to initiate tube feeding after Cruzan could be
based on changes in their attitudes toward living wills. After Cruzan our
respondents may perceive themselves to be more deferential to living wills
than they were before. The likelihood that this was an important factor is
weakened by the small percentage (33%) of physicians whose opposition to
tube feeding was premised on the living wills.
Second, physicians may fear that treatments which are commenced will
have to be continued indefinitely. This explanation for their increased
opposition to tube feeding is both intuitively convincing and alarming. As the
President's Commission observed in 1982, a "troubling wrong occurs when a
treatment that might save a life or improve health is not started because the
health care personnel are afraid that they will find it very difficult to stop
treatment if, as is fairly likely, it proves to be of little benefit and greatly
burdens the patient." 35
Similar reluctance to try heroic measures could occur in any state
perceived by its citizens to place undue restrictions on the discontinuance of
life support. As a result, judges and legislators in states which place the most
stringent limits on the withdrawing of medical care, such as Missouri, New
YorkO, and Oklahoma,37 should recognize the real risk that well-intended
safeguards could have harmful consequences which outweigh the expected
benefits.

after Cruzan. For that finding, another explanation is necessary.
35. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 24, at 75.
36. See In re O'Connor, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613 (N.Y. 1988) (precluding
discontinuance of treatment without clear and convincing evidence of specific
patient preferences).
37. See OKLA. STAT. ANN.tit. 63, § 3004.3-5 (West 1990 Supp.) The
statute only permits withholding of nutrition and hydration if (1) the patient
is competent and will die of some other cause before death by starvation or
dehydration; or (2) the nutrition "will itself cause severe, untractable and longlasting pain.., or hydration is not medically possible;" or (3) the patient left
clear and convincing instructions after contracting "a specific illness or injury"
based on information sufficient to constitute informed consent. Id. Ohio and
Washington also appear to place special limits on decisions about nutrition
and hydration. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2133.08-.09 (Page's 1991 Supp.)
(in the absence of a living will, nutrition and hydration may only be withheld
from terminal patients who have been in a permanent unconscious state for
twelve months and only with an order from probate court); In re Grant, 747
P.2d 445, 451 (Wash. 1987), modified, 757 P.2d 534 (Wash. 1988) (5-4
against authorizing parents to forego artificial nutrition and hydration for
terminally-ill child).
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Regrettably, the Missouri Supreme Court may have further exacerbated
this result by suggesting that it might be more defensible to withhold tube
feeding than to withdraw it.m The court noted that the continuation of tube
feeding is less invasive than the initial placement of the tube and then
concluded that tube feeding was not "oppressively burdensome" to Ms.
Cruzan.3 9 This language may give the distinction between withholding and
withdrawing more legal and clinical weight than it deserves.' Although
placing a feeding tube is more invasive than the continuation of tube feeding,
the difference will rarely be sufficient to justify the withholding of a feeding
tube in one case but not the other. Instead, as others have amply noted, 41
recognition of a distinction between failure to initiate a treatment and failure
to continue will often discourage the initiation of appropriate heroic care.
B. The Influence of a Statutory Living Will
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan dramatically
increased public interest in living wills. In its aftermath, the Society for the

38. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 422-24.
39. Id.
40. Most courts have rejected the distinction between not starting
treatment and stopping treatment. E.g., Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So .2d 160,
163 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978), aft'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980); Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 637-38 (Mass. 1986); McKay v.
Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 625 (Nev. 1990); In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1234
(N.J. 1985); Grant, 747 P.2d at 452; see also MEISEL, supra note 22, § 4.4
(collecting cases). Contra Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 422-24 (noting that the
continuation of tube feeding is less invasive than the initial placement of the
tube and concluding that tube feeding was not "oppressively burdensome to
Nancy); Workman's Circle Home & Infirmary for the Aged v. Fink, 514
N.Y.S.2d 893, 896 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (permitting withholding of gastronomy but
not intravenous feeding because the latter was "more passive and less
intrusive"). Cf.In re Riddlemoser, 564 A.2d 812, 816 n.5 (Md. 1989) (noting
that withholding and withdrawing care are "separate and distinct," but not
relying upon the distinction). The distinction is most likely to be material
when the initiation of treatment would impose a materially greater burden on
the patient than continuation of an existing treatment. See Cruzan, 760
S.W.2d at 422-23; Worlnen's Circle, 514 N.Y.S.2d at 895-96.
41. Brophy, 497 N.E.2d at 638; In re Conroy, 486 A.2d at 1234;
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 24, at 61-62, 73-77; Joanne Lynn & James
F. Childress, Must PatientsAlways Be Given Food and Water?, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Oct. 1983, at 17, 19-20.
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Right to Die experienced a 500% increase in living will reqaests.42 In
Missouri,.the Midwest Bioethics Center witnessed an explosion in requests for
living will forms. We were interested in studying the clinical impact on a
realistic borderline case of preprinted living wills like the one widely
distributed in Missouri by the Midwest Bioethics Center.
Overall, forty-seven percent (47%) of the physicians said they would
oppose a feeding tube if the patient had executed the living will in our study.
When these physicians were asked what they would have recommended in the
absence of a living will, thirty-three percent (33%) changed their recommendation. Thus, one-third of the physicians who recommended against tube
feedings had based their decision entirely on the patient's living will, and they
comprise one-sixth of the total respondents. Not surprisingly, those physicians
who received the living will which specifically included nutrition and
hydration were both more likely to oppose tube feeding than those with the
standard living will (53% vs. 42%; p=0.02) and also more likely to change
their recommendation in the absence of a living will (40% v. 26%; p<0.05).
One possible explanation for the modest impact of the living wills is that
the physicians did not believe that the patient was terminally ill as required
by the language of the living will. 43 The patient in our scenario could have

lived for months and perhaps even years. As a result, some physicians (4%)
commented that the living will was inapplicable because the patient was not
terminally ill.
In addition, the standard living will did not specify whether artificial
nutrition and hydration were to be withheld. Under the Missouri living will
statute, "death-prolonging procedures" do not include the administration of
artificial nutrition and hydration.' Although we did not use the living will
form provided by the Missouri statute, some physicians may have concluded
that the language of our living will should be interpreted to exclude artificial
nutrition and hydration.

42. Concern for Dying, SOCIETY FOR THE RIGHT TO DIE NEWSLETTER
(New York, N.Y.), Fall 1990, at 1. Between the Court's June 25, 1990
decision and mid-October 1990, that organization had filled more than
400,000 requests for forms of living will and durable power of attorney. Id.
At that time, demand was reportedly still growing. Id.
43. While the Missouri living will statute defines "terminal" conditions
to be those resulting in death in a "short-time" regardless of the application of
medical procedures, our living will did not use an explicit time limitation.
Mo. REv. STAT. § 459.010.6 (1986).
44. Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010(3) (1986). However, the Cruzan
decisions place no limit on oral or written instructions which extend beyond
the terms of the living will statute.
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Because of these uncertainties about the applicability of the living will
to the facts of our scenario, the study may understate the number of physicians
who would respect a fully applicable living will. The increased deference
paid to the specific living will supports this hypothesis. On the other hand,
the study instrument informed the physicians that the patient had a living will
which was reprinted on the back of the questionnaire. In clinical settings, by
contrast, physicians will often be unaware of the living will's existence at the
time that a treatment decision has to be made. 45
Although the impact of the living will in our study was modest, it is
legally quite interesting. It illuminates the role which living wills may play
in those common cases where the living will is either ambiguous or inapplicable. The most likely explanations for deference under these circumstances
have interesting and quite different legal implications. First, those physicians
who deferred to the living will may have viewed the patient's condition as
"terminal." Second, these physicians may not have read the text of the living
will, which was reprinted on the back side of the questionnaire, and, thus, may
not have been aware that the living will was limited to conditions which
would be terminal regardless of treatment. Third, these physicians may have
assumed that the very existence of a living will revealed material information
about the patient's values.
1. Ambiguities in Language of the Living Will
The applicability of the living will turned, inter alia, on whether the
patient's condition was "terminal." 6 Both living wills defined "terminal"
conditions to be those which would result in death "whether or not lifesustaining procedures are utilized." In the study scenario, as in many clinical
cases, the life expectancy of the patient was uncertain. In one sense, all 89year-old men are near death, but that does not necessarily make them
"terminal." The patient's neurological injury had not impaired the patient's
vital functions, except for the ingestion of food. Artificial feeding could
conceivably have prolonged the patient's life for months or longer. However,
the patient's poor health did increase the risk of diseases, like pneumonia,
which could hasten death. Under these circumstances, reliance on the living
will is a close call, especially in a state where evidence of patient wishes is
supposed to be clear and convincing.
45. Marion Danis et al., A ProspectiveStudy ofAdvance Directivesfor
Life-Sustaining Care, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 882, 884 (1991) (advance
directives were transferred from nursing home to hospital for only 25 of 71
hospitalizations).
46. It also turned on whether the living will was meant to apply to
artificial nutrition and hydration. See text accompanying note 44, supra.
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2. Ignorance of the Living Will's Terms

An alternative explanation for the deference shown to the living wills in
our study is that the physicians did not read the terms of the living wills
printed on the back side of the questionnaire. 47 While there is evidence that
living wills often do not come to the attention of treating physicians in time
to influence the treatment decision, no one has studied how carefully health
care providers examine the text of advance directives.49 If physicians do not
familiarize themselves with the actual contents of their patients' living wills,
the movement toward greater use of living wills and toward more specific and
more lengthy advance directives will face some difficult practical obstacles."
More study of physicians' practices is clearly in order.
3. Consciously Applying the Living Will Beyond its Terms
Finally, the physicians who were influenced by the living will may have
viewed the directive as a broad statement of the patient's values, not just a set
of specific instructions. They may have felt that the living will Was meant to
apply beyond its terms. As a result, they may have given it some weight
when making their treatment recommendations. If so, their conduct has
intuitive appeal, but creates the risk of discontinuing treatments that the
patient would have wanted. Thus far, no court has ruled on the propriety of
this expansive use of living wills. In order to decide whether to endorse it,

47. The living will also required certification of a "terminal condition" by
a second physician.
48. Danis et al., supra note 45, at 884 (advance directives were
transferred from nursing home to hospital for only 25 of 71 hospitalizations).
49. The Danis Study cited in the prior footnote is not reassuring. In that
study, the presence of an advance directive did not make care more consistent
with the patient's previously expressed preferences.
50. E.g., Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395
cc(f)(1), 1396a(a)(57)-(58), 1396a(w) (1990 Supp.) (these provisions are
commonly known as the Patient Self-Determination Act and require notice to
certain patients of their rights to give advance directives.); Linda L. Emanuel
et al., Advance Directives for Medical Care-A Case For Greater Use, 324
NEW ENG. J. MED. 889, 895 (1991); Linda L. Emanuel & Ezekiel Emanuel,
The Medical Directive:A New ComprehensiveAdvance CareDocument, 261
JAMA 3288, 3289 (1989); Joan M. Gibson, Reflecting on Values, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 451, 451-54 (1990) (advancing patient autonomy through completion of
a "values history").
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lawmakers will need to have a better idea of what patients would want done
under these circumstances. Here too, more research is needed.51
In the interim, most courts will probably decline to authorize cessation
of such treatments not covered by the living wills unless they receive evidence
of oral instructions by the patient, or the patient has authorized a proxy to
decide.52 Therefore, patients who want their surrogates to have discretion in
cases not covered by their specific instructions should provide this authority
in their advance directives. The easiest way to do this is to supplement or
replace their living wills with a durable power of attorney for health care
decision-making 3 which authorizes their surrogate to make that decision in
their behalf. Alternatively, patients who prefer greater control of the treatment
decision could attempt to draft living wills which exhaustively state the
circumstances in which they would like treatment withheld. Another option
is to supplement the individual's living will with a statement of the patient's
values and of the factors which should be considered when making decisions

51. No researcher has studied this specific issue, but some research is
being done on the motivations and wishes of people who give advance
directives. See, e.g., Nancy Eider et al., Community Attitudes and Knowledge
AboutAdvance CareDirectives,_ J. AM. BOARD FAM. PRACICE (forthcoming Nov. 1992) (examining why people do or do not give advance directives);
cf. Ashwini Sehgal et al., How Strictly Do Dialysis Patients Want Their
Advance DirectivesFollowed, 267 JAMA 59, 61 (1992) (39% of the patients
with advance directive gave "no leeway" for overriding the directive if doing
so were in their "best interests.").
52. Although the courts have been willing to extrapolate a patient's
intentions from ambiguous or general language in advance directives, see
MEISEL, supra note 22, § 12.10, this ordinarily occurs when the language of
the advance directive is sufficiently ambiguous to encompass the treatment
decision in question. Courts have also been willing to supplement written
advance directives with evidence of oral instructions. In re Browning, 568 So.
2d 4, 15-17 (Fla. 1990) (living will not applicable to nonterminal patient, but
oral evidence clear and convincing). But once the terms of the advance
directive have been interpreted, the courts have not yet been asked to
authorize the withholding of treatments which fall outside of the living will
absent an oral directive by the patient.
53. See, e.g., Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 404.800-.865 (Supp. 1991). For a
related discussion on proxy health care decision-making power, see J. Daniel
Patterson, Note, The Proxy Puzzle & The Durable Power of Attorney for
Health CareAct, 57 Mo. L. REv. 935 (1992).
54. Emanuel et al., supra note 50; Emanuel & Emanuel, supra note 50.
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for the patient.' Regrettably, these value statements may not satisfy courts
which insist on clear and convincing proof of the patient's wishes regarding
a specific treatment decision. In those jurisdictions, a durable power of
attorney is the surest way to avoid the risks of omission which are inherent in
the execution of a living will.
C. Family Preferences
In our study, physicians readily deferred to family wishes. Forty-two
percent (42%) of the physicians who initially recommended tube feedings said
that they would have withheld the feedings at the family's request. The
physicians who initially opposed tube feeding were even more deferential to
the family's wishes. Sixty-six percent (66%) of physicians said they would
comply with a family's request to administer tube feedings. In both cases, the
family's preferences were more influential among physicians who had received
the standard living will than among those who had received the specific living
will.5 6 The dominant role of the family was also reflected in the comments
of the respondents, most of whom emphasized the importance of the family's
wishes. For example, physicians responded, "I go 99% with what the family
wants."
As a practical matter these findings are not surprising. In the absence of
binding patient preferences, a physician's deference to reasonable family
wishes is consistent with medical custom 57 ethical consensus 58 and public
opinion5 9 Indeed, most physicians will follow the family's instructions even

55. See Gibson, supra note 50, at 452-54; Pam Lambert et al., The Values
History: An Innovation in Medical SurrogateDecision-making,18 L. MED. &
HEALTH CARE 202, 210-11 (1990); Sehgal et al., supra note 51, at 62-63..
56. Interestingly, the physicians who favored tube feedings despite the
specific living will also demonstrated a greater willingness to resist family
pressures to withhold tube feedings. Their resistance to both the living will
and family preferences may reflect strong personal opposition to the
withholding of artificial nutrition and hydration.
57. Arnold Relman, The Saikewicz Decision: Judges as Physicians,298
NEw ENG. J. MED. 508, 508 (1978).
58. See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 24, at 126-28; THE HASTINGS
CENTER, GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT
AND THE CARE OF THE DYING, supra note 23.

59. E.g., In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 447 n.11 (N.J. 1987) (citing N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 2, 1986, at C10); Earl Ubell, Should Death Be A Patient's
Choice, PARADE MAG., Feb. 9, 1992, at 24, 26.
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when they conflict with the patient's previously expressed wishes.' In our
study, this deference is particularly easy to understand because the physicians
may have harbored doubts about both the applicability of living wills and
about the patients' best interests.
As a legal matter, however, these findings are more interesting. While
many states either authorize family decision-making or give serious consideration to family wishes, many others, including Missouri, have yet to authorize
informal family decision-making. 61 In Cruzan, the Missouri Supreme Court
refused to grant the patient's father and guardian the power to refuse lifesustaining treatment without a formal delegation of power by the patient.62
As a result, deference to families who seek the termination of life-sustaining
treatments is not yet sanctioned by the law of Missouri.
The extent of physicians' deference to families who pushed against tube
feeding suggests that physicians either (1) are unaware of the bearing of
Cruzan on this issue, (2) read Cruzan as applying only to the specific facts at
issue. in that case (i.e., the cessation of ongoing tube feeding in a vegetative
patieit); or (3) are willing to run the legal risks of acquiescing in the wishes
of the family. Physicians might be willing to accept the risks of deferring to
the family if they personally believe that withholding tube feeding is the right
thing to do but want family support for that action. Physicians may also
perceive more risk of litigation in confronting families than in deferring to
them.6 ' In our study, the physicians who commented on the importance of

60. Robert W. Blum, Death and Decision Making Among Minnesota
Physicians, 65 MINN. MED. 499, 500 (1982); Redleaf, supra note 24, at 93536 (nearly three-quarters would violate a patient's oral wishes; one-third would
violate a binding written directive); Joel M. Zinberg, Decisions Forthe Dying:
An EmpiricalStudy of Physicians' Responses to Advance Directives, 13 VT.
L. REv. 445, 478 (1989) (61% of Vermont interviewees and 74% in California
would delay implementation of a living will pending family agreement).
61. Judith Areen, Advance Directives Under State Law and Judicial
Decisions, 19 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 91 (1991).
62. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 425.
63. See Redleaf, supra note 24, at 936; Zinberg, supra note 60, at 477
(physician insistence on family support principally influenced by fear of
liability). As a practical matter, only the patient's family or the patient's
estate could bring a civil lawsuit after the treatment of a patient like the one
in our scenario. When the family agrees on continued care, the risks of
liability for continued treatment are minimal. There are no reported cases
awarding damages against physicians who have disregarded an advance
directive at the instigation of the family. The only analogous cases involved
lawsuits against physicians who allegedly disregarded the wishes of a
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family preferences were also more likely to remark on the legal risks
associated with the treatment decision.
The legal implications change markedly if the living will is believed to
govern the scenario. In that event, both law and current ethical consensus
agree that the living will should be respected. However, sixty-nine percent
(69%) of the physicians who based their recommendation to withhold tube
feeding on the presence of a living will said they would change that
recommendation if the family wanted more aggressive care. As a result, our
findings are consistent with previous studies suggesting that physicians will
not follow patient wishes unless the family agrees." Nevertheless, caution
should be exercised in generalizing from our findings. Our study presented
the physicians with an ambiguous factual context where the decision-making
was more complex than a simple choice between clear patient wishes and
contrary family wishes. Under the circumstances presented in our scenario,
the willingness of many physicians to change their recommendations may
have been influenced by the uncertain authority of the living will and by the
physicians' own ambivalence about the patient's best interests. Under these
circumstances, family support may have been particularly important. Of
course, fear of litigation by the families could play a role as well.
As a result, patients who do not wish to have their preferences overridden
would be well advised to discuss their wishes with family members and
formally designate a family member who is comfortable with those wishes as
a proxy decision-maker.
V. CONCLUSION
At the very least, the results of this study should make courts pause
before grounding decisions about the withholding of medical care on
assumptions about the instrumental role of judicial opinions in shaping
provider conduct. Lay perceptions and misperceptions about the risks of

currentlycompetentpatient. Neither suit succeeded in recovering compensatory damages. See Foster v. Tourtellotte, 704 F.2d 1109, 1110 (9th Cir. 1983)
(when patient's wife and one of his three sons opposed removal of respirator,
trial court's denial of compensatory damages not appealed); Ross v. Hilltop
Rehabilitation Hosp., 676 F. Supp. 1528, 1534 (D. Colo. 1987) (patient's sister
opposed discontinuation of gastrostomy feeding and threatened suit; federal
civil rights suit by personal representative dismissed). Damages in these
cases, like those in wrongful life cases, present difficult conceptual and policy
issues. They would require a comparison between life and nonexistence.
64. See supra note 60. And a recent study suggests that many patients
would want their wishes overridden if proxies believed that treatment would
be in their best interests. Sehgal, supra note 51, at 61.
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litigation and about the distinction between withholding and withdrawing
treatment seem to be as influential as the actual holding of Cruzan.
In addition, the unanswered questions raised by our study point out the
need for further research about the behavior of health care providers and about
patients' expectations. How well do physicians familiarize themselves with
the text of their patients' living wills? Do providers give effect to living wills
beyond their terms and, if so, is this what patients would want? Are patients
better served by discussing their wishes with family members than by signing
a living will? What makes the distinction between withholding and withdrawing treatment so powerful in practice? The answers to these questions will
help inform the ongoing debate about how best to regulate this controversial
field.
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